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Commentary
The Politics of Reform
Robert B. Hackey
Providence Coliege
The articles on individual health insurance market reform in this issue
raise fundamental questions ahout the role of competitive markets in pro-
moting access to health care. The decision to impose new restrictions on
insurers, or conversely, not to regulate insurers' rating and enrollment
practices, rests on certain core assumptions about how the world works
(Thompson 1981). ln New Jersey, for example, policy makers viewed rat-
ing and enrollment reforms in the individual health insurance market as
a means to reduce the number of uninsured persons (Garnick, Swartz.
and Skwara 1998). This basic policy hypothesis unciergirds Individual
insurance market reforms such as the removal of preexisting-condition
clauses, limitations on underwriting practices, and the introduction of
community rating. If this assumption is tlawed, however, incremental
reforms will be ill-equipped to address many of the most significant
shortcomings ofthe marketplace.
The articles in this issue return to the familiar "competition versus
regulation" debate which dominated the health policy literature in the
1970s and 1980s. First, what lessons can be gleaned from the case stud-
ies? Should state government reject insurers' claims of "actuarial fair-
ness" in enrollment and rating in favor of reforms designed to protect
certain groups from discrimination? What are the consequences of doing
so? Second, can incremental reforms which regulate the rating and
enrollment practices of insurers effectively limit discrimination against
chronically ill persons or other high-risk subscribers? Or are regulatory
cures worse than the disease? Finally, what are the political dynamics of
reforming the individual heaith insurance market? Under what circum-
stances are reforms most likely to surface?
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The Politics of Lesson Drawing
Before investing scarce political capital and resources into promoting
health care reforms, legislators and other state policy makers frequently
turn to colleagues and think tanks for insights about which groups will
benefit and lose from the proposed changes. State policy makers draw on
closely knit intergovernmental networks to keep abreast of recent devel-
opments in health policy—^organizations such as the National Gover-
nors' Association, the National Council of State Legislatures, and
numerous policy centers and think tanks provide updates of recent leg-
islative initiatives, policy debates, and court cases for decision makers.
The diffusion of innovations is a two-way street—while successful
reforms are quickly emulated by others, policy disasters can be avoided
by following the experience of others. The case studies in this issue raise
an important policy question: Why did insurers withdraw from states
which reformed their individual health insurance markets? Were the
reforms so restrictive that insurers found it impossible to sell individual
policies and make a profit?
As the articles by Adele M. Kirk and Mark A. Hall demonstrate, while
the number of insurers selling policies in a state may decline in the wake
of reform, individual market reforms do not invariably lead to a market
implosion. Although reforms clearly cut into insurers' profit margins by
enabling previously "uninsurable" persons to enter the individual market,
the decision of insurers to exit the individual market seems out of pro-
portion to the scope and timing of the changes passed by state legisla-
tures. In Kentucky, for example, most reforms never took hold, but insur-
ers left anyway and have failed to return. Nevertheless, the experiences
of Kentucky and Washington have become policy anecdotes (Rochefort
1998) or symbols (Stone 1997) of the perils of state intervention in the
individual health insurance market.
The decision to exit the individual health market is not preordained for
indemnity carriers. Instead, as Albert Hirschman (1970) observed, firms
may respond to a changing market environment in three ways, which he
terms exit, voice, and loyalty. Kentucky's and Washington's experiences
illustrate the exit option: insurers chose to leave the market when faced
with the threat of adverse selection. Alternafively, insurers may also seek
to shape reforms through the legislative process (voice) or seek new ways
to earn a profit under the new regulated market, using the threat of exit
as a bargaining chip to exact concessions from subscribers in the form of
leaner benefits (loyalty). Few indemnity insurers, however, pursued a
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voice or loyalty strategy following the passage of reforms in Kentucky,
New York, and Washington. Why did insurers choose to exit those par-
ticular marketplaces, rather than seek to modify the new regulations or
change their pricing and enrollment policies?
The obvious, and most common, answer to this qtiestion is that insur-
ers could not earn a profit in a reformed marketplace. This view, however,
is not fully supported by the cases. The case studies of Kentucky and
New York raise questions about insurers' claims that they have lost mil-
lions in the individual market. In addition, the individual market repre-
sents a small share of most insurers and HMOs' total enrollment; profits
from the small group or group markets could be used to cross-subsidize
the sale of individual policies if insurers desired to stay in the market.
Furthermore, even in states with extensive oversight of insurance premi-
ums, state officials have generally allowed insurers to raise rates in the
individual market substantially to compensate for adverse selection. As
Hall notes in his case study of individual market reforms in New York,
the state department of insurance denied requests for substantial rate
increases by Empire Blue Cross and Oxford Health, limiting both to a 10
percent premium increase. At the same time, however, state officials
approved a cash infusion from the state's risk-adjustment pools to offset
expected losses. In sum, efforts to revamp the individual health insurance
market need not result in fiscal catastrophe for "loyal" insurers who do
not exit the market. If this is the case, why did the reforms in Kentucky
and the like lead to a mass exodus from the marketplace?
The decision of insurers to exit the marketplace following the passage
of reforms sent a powerful message to policy makers contemplating sim-
ilar initiatives in other states. In effect, the exit option can be viewed as
a symbolic strategy. Based in large part on the experiences of Kentucky
and Washington, the policy image of individual insurance market
reforms is now decidedly negative, although much of the conventional
wisdom about the consequences of the reforms in Kentucky and New
York fails to jibe with the states' actual experiences. Nevertheless, the
mass exodus of insurers from Kentucky, New York, Vermont, and Wash-
ington provides a powerful policy anecdote for prospective reformers by
illustrating the perils of interfering with the "normal" operation of free
markets.
In reality, the changes in the individual health insurance market are
more complex. Conservative critiques of reform (Malkin 1997; Litow
and Davidoff 1994) bear an eerie resemblance to Elizabeth McCaughey's
(1994) well-publicized diatribe against the Chnton administration's Health
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Security Act. In both cases, public debate over proposed health care
reform was shaped by opponents' rhetorical broadsides long after new
information became available which questioned the conventional wis-
dom (Fallows 1995). Despite evidence from Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, and Vermont that reforms need not destabilize individual
health insurance markets in the long run, the policy image of individual
market reforms continues to be shaped by the negative images associated
with the experiences of Kentucky and Washington.
Individual health insurance markets do not exist in a policy vacuum
but reflect ongoing political and economic forces within their states.
Implicit in many critiques of many reform proposals, such as commu-
nity rating, is the notion that unfettered markets were performing well
prior to the enactment of reforms. Long before the passage of individ-
ual market reforms in the 1990s, insurers used high premiums, limited
benefits, and selective marketing to limit their financial exposure to
adverse selection (Gabel 1991). An important counterfactual question
remains unasked by critics: What would the market look like in the
absence of reform? As Katherine Swartz and Deborah W. Garnick note
in their article, the individual health insurance market in New Jersey
was "on the verge of collapsing" before the passage of reform. Fur-
thermore, other factors apart from the enactment of market reforms
contributed to declining enrollment in the individual market. Indepen-
dent insurance agents and brokers are critical players in the individual
health insurance market, both in offering information about products
and in selling policies to consumers (Garnick, Swartz. and Skwara 1998).
Hall's discussion of New York illustrates that insurers' own actions
(e.g., lowering or eliminating commissions for agents who sold indi-
vidual policies) effectively reduced demand for their products. Some
insurers even told prospective customers that they did not sell indi-
vidual policies, when in fact they were legally obligated to do so. If
agents have few incentives to sell individual health insurance policies,
the fact that fewer policies are sold in the wake of guaranteed-issue
and community-rating reforms raises the possibility that other factors
may have contributed to declining enrollment in the individual market.
Although states such as New York, which implemented pure commu-
nity rating in the individual market, saw premiums rise following the
passage of reforms, premiums had also increased substantially in the
small group and individual markets prior to the enactment of reform
(American College of Physicians 1996).
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The Limitations of Individuai Heaith
insurance iViarket Reform
A reformed individual health insurance market appears an unlikely vehi-
cle for increasing the number of persons with health insurance. A steady
dechne in the percentage of Americans with employer-sponsored health
insurance over the past decade has contributed to a corresponding rise in
the percentage ofthe population without health insurance. Significantly,
the ranks of the uninsured have continued to increase during a period of
economic expansion. The principal shortcoming of individual insurance
market reforms in addressing the plight of the uninsured, however, is that
all markets discriminate against those who cannot pay. In health care, the
market for health insurance also discriminates against those who are
sick; competition among insurers is based as much on risk selection as it
is on price (ibid.).
Reformers face several dilemmas in reshaping the individual health
insurance market. While higher prices may force some consumers from
the market, lower prices appear unlikely to attract a substantial number
of new subscribers. Recent studies suggest that neither insurance market
reforms nor state subsidies of health insurance coverage have had an
appreciable effect on decreasing the number of uninsured Americans
(Sloan and Conover 1998; Marquis and Long 1995). In addition, the dis-
cussion of rising costs in the individual market tends to focus on the
absolute, rather than the relative, cost of health insurance coverage. Pre-
miums for even modest individual coverage may be out of reach for
many working-class families. Finally, the existing practices of risk-rated
health insurance penalize those individuals who most need access to
affordable coverage.
The hopes of reformers that lower premiums, whether achieved through
market competition or subsidies, would encourage the uninsured to pur-
chase individual health insurance policies appear to be misplaced. Gen-
erally, insurance market reforms have not succeeded in their goal of
increasing insurance coverage. To the contrary, individual insurance
enrollment has declined in the cases presented in this issue following the
enactment of reform. Eurthermore, economic analyses of consumers'
sensitivity to changes in insurance premiums suggest that relatively few
uninsured workers would purchase individual coverage on a voluntary
basis even if it was substantially less expensive (Marquis and Long
1995). As Swartz and Garnick note, "Even competitive insurance mar-
kets cannot drive the cost of health insurance so low that healthy, low-
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income people will decide to purchase it." Implicit in many economic
analyses of insurance market reforms is an assumption that individuals
with a greater willingness to pay for health insurance will be able to pur-
chase coverage. The cost of coverage for part-time workers, the working
poor, and other families of modest means effectively places even bare-
bones coverage beyond the reach of millions of potentially eligible indi-
viduals.'
The desire of insurers to link premiums and coverage to subscribers'
perceived level of risk creates significant barriers for many individuals to
obtain even modest health insurance coverage. The practice of risk rating
suffers from several fundamental flaws. "Even the most widely used risk
categories such as age have poor predictive value because within-group
variations are so great relative to between-group variations" (Light 1992:
2505). Len M. Nichols observes in his article that "the inability to ask
health status questions and to set premiums based on health status means
that the insurers' effectiveness in screening risks is reduced. . . . Post-
reform, insurers know with certainty there is a category of previously
identifiable risks on whom the company will now lose money." While this
is true, the passage of reforms does not condemn insurers to unprofitabil-
ity, but rather reduces their ability fo engage in health-based discrimina-
tion against medically vulnerable individuals. This behavior, of course,
was precisely what motivated lawmakers to enact reform in the first
place.
As Lynn Etheredge (1986: 312) noted more than a decade ago, "insur-
ers are also ethically responsible for their activities, particularly where
these are self-determined, and for their impact on society." The enact-
ment of enrollment and rating reforms within the individual health insur-
ance market reflects a profound sense of unease among policy makers
regarding the ethical foundations of insurers' behavior. Although com-
munity rating and explicit cross-subsidization of sicker members of the
community was integral to the development of Blue Cross plans in the
1940s, by the 1990s both the Blues and commercial insurers sought to
1. Swartz and Garnick's discussion of individual market reform in New Jersey in this issue
illuslrates the following point: In the fourth quarter of 1997, the cosi of a monthly premium for
single coverage ranged from $160 for the lowest cost indemnity plan lo $!96 for the cheapest
HMO plan, A part-time employee working thirty hours a week at the rate of $10 an hour would
pay a minimtimof 12.3 percent of her $15,600 annual gross income for indemnity coverage. An
individual seeking to enroll in an HMO would spend more than 15 perceni ($2,352) of her
$15,600 annual salary on health insurance premiums. This actually understates !he proportional
impac! of individual health insurance coverage, for unlike most employees who purchase group
health insurance, premiums for individual health insurance polieies are not paid on a pre-tax
basis, but instead must be deducted from employees's disposable income after taxes.
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screen prospective risks and to charge different premiums from different
risk categories. Nichols also argues that premium increases are likely to
be examples of insurers getting "pessimistic about their likelihood of
drawing low-risk enrollees, compared to their competitors" in a regulated
market, and thus insurers set prices higher to deter high risks from pur-
chasing coverage. As a result, "unprofitable" individuals are likely to be
driven from the market altogether. In addition, Nichols's concern over the
demise of "actuarial fairness" in reformed markets misses the point that
all insurance involves some degree of cross-subsidization. As Deborah
Stone (1989: 598) noted more than a decade ago, "If actuarial rating were
carried out perfectly, that is, if we could predict each person's precise risk
of incurring the particular harm and charge him or her accordingly, then
in effect each contributor would be paying for him or herself."
The Path Not Taken
The articles in this issue illuminate the dynamics of insurers' response
to regulation, but they leave a number of important political questions
either unasked or unanswered. Health care reform does not emerge from
a black box; the political dynamics which lead up to reform hold impor-
tant lessons for policy makers. A more complete understanding ofthe
politics of individual market reforms at the state level requires answers
to the following questions:
• Was the demand for insurance market reform broad based, or did it
reflect the interests of one company or group?
• How diverse was the interest group network which produced the
reform proposal? How did groups outside of the insurance industry
(e.g., consumer advocates, social workers, hospitals, pharmacies,
businesses, etc.) view the reforms? Was the legislative process inclu-
sive or closed?
• How were reforms framed? Were efforts to reform the individual
health insurance market high-profile affairs which generated consid-
erable media attention and lobbying, or were they relatively obscure
matters?
• Since reforms to the individual health insurance market have redis-
tributive consequences, it would be useful to understand how dif-
ferent segments ofthe industry responded to the proposals. In par-
ticular, how did individual agents, HMOs, Blue Cross plans, and
indemnity carriers seek to affect legislation under consideration?
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• How did various population subgroups affected by the reforms
respond? Did healthy young adults, for example, organize to protest
their higher premiums or simply leave the market?
• What role did legislative and gubernatorial leadership play in plac-
ing reform on the formal agenda?
Proponents of individual health insurance market reform face a num-
ber of significant political obstacles. Since most of the insured population
obtains health coverage through employers or federal and state programs,
the political constituency for individual market reforms is weak. Reform-
ers face "imbalanced political markets" at the state level (Marmor, Wit-
man, and Heagy 1976). Insurers, particularly Blue Cross plans, continue
to be major players in state legislative debates over health care reform
(Hackey 1998). Purchasers of individual health insurance policies, in
contrast, are a more diverse group. Although most are wage and salary
workers and their families, their health insurance needs vary widely. In
short, sick and healthy individuals will be affected differently by reform
proposals. Guaranteed issue, limits on risk rating, bans on preexisting-
condition exclusions, and other reforms designed to minimize or elimi-
nate "medical redlining" will win little support from young, healthy indi-
viduals seeking inexpensive policies to protect themselves from the costs
of a major illness. Indeed, since these individuals are most likely to pay
higher premiums in the wake of reform, their interests are threatened by
reforms aimed at increasing access to the health insurance market. As
"low risks," they are lucrative customers for insurers who are unlikely
to encounter difficulties obtaining coverage. In contrast, individuals with
chronic illness stand to benefit the most from guaranteed issue, guaran-
teed renewability, and limits on the use of medical underwriting by insur-
ers. For this population, the difficulty of obtaining coverage rivals cost as
a policy concern. Proposals that eliminate barriers to purchasing cover-
age or introduce some form of community-rated premiums are likely to
increase demand for health insurance among "high-risk" patients.
Differences in the political interests of persons seeking individual
health insurance coverage extend beyond health status to include income,
employment status, and age. The diversity ofthe individual health insur-
ance market inhibits collective action, as a disorganized, heterogeneous
group is difficult to mobilize for the trench warfare of legislative debates.
In contrast, health insurance coverage is an important issue in many
union contract negotiations, as workers sharing a common health plan
are bound together by a common interest and mobilize easily for politi-
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cal action (e.g., informational picketing, strikes, grassroots lobbying).
Policy makers contemplating individual health insurance market reforms
face a dilemma: Should reforms seek to lower costs for the majority of
subscribers who are healthy or should they attempt to address the con-
cerns of persons with persistent health problems who are most at risk of
discrimination?
Prospects and Pitfalls for Reformers
To date, reforming the individual health insurance market has not attracted
the prominence afforded expanded eligibility for Medicaid, children's
health insurance initiatives, managed care regulation, and similar poHcy
initiatives on state policy agendas. While many states have reformed
their small group insurance markets, few have required guaranteed issue
and limited rating or required insurers to offer community-rated products
in the individual market. The low visibility ofthe itidividual market vis
a vis the small group and group markets is also evident in the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Although
the HIPAA required insurers to sell products to consumers in the indi-
vidual market, the act neither limited the prices which could be charged
for individual coverage nor ptotected the interests of persons who had
not previously held insurance coverage. Alternative policy instruments
for improving access to health insurance for the chronically ill have
enjoyed limited success. Although high-risk pools have been estab-
lished in half of the states to provide coverage for persons who are
otherwise "uninsurable," their high cost has limited their ability to
extend coverage to more than a small percentage of potential beneficia-
ries (Kuttner 1997).
Policy debates over insurance market reforms such as community
rating and guaranteed issue will resemble James Q. Wilson's (1980)
description of "entrepreneurial politics" in which concentrated costs are
imposed on an industry in an effort to provide diffuse benefits for soci-
ety. Securing the passage of such reforms is difficult, for disorganized
consumers face concerted opposition from industry groups who view
insurance market reforms as a threat to their ability to avoid adverse
selection and segment risk. Under such conditions, efforts to enact simi-
lar reforms in most states will falter in the absence of entrepreneurial
leadership from key legislators, the governor, or powerful interests (e.g..
Blue Cross).
As in previous debates over hospital rate setting (Hackey 1998), a
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looming fiscal crisis creates a new political environment and breaks
down traditional barriers to reform. In Massachusetts. New Jersey, New
York, and Vermont, concerns over the deteriorating fiscal condition of
local Blue Cross plans provided the catalyst for individual market
reforms as a means of supporting their role as "insurers of last resort."
The aura of crisis was particularly acute in New Jersey, where state
officials faced a court order to revamp its system of financing uncompen-
sated hospital care that had provided Blue Cross with extensive cross-
subsidies. In the absence of reform. Blue Cross plans warned that they
would be forced to seek substantial premium increases or withdraw from
the market altogether. As Nichols observes in this issue, the role of Blue
Cross in sustaining (if not dominating) the market for individual health
insurance policies legitimized state action to stabilize the marketplace.
The significance of crisis in framing individual market reforms did not
diminish after the passage of legislation. Instead, the mass exodus of
indemnity insurers following the implementation of community rating,
guaranteed issue, and hmits on underwriting precipitated a new crisis in
the marketplace.
Unlike recent legislation aimed at regulating the perceived excesses of
managed care organizations, the political appeal of individual health
insurance market reforms to policy makers is limited. Intense opposition
from commercial health insurers and HMOs, coupled with the negative
policy image associated with other states' experiences with reform, make
the process of coalition formation difficult in state legislatures. Legisla-
tors interested in polishing their health policy credentials will find more
attractive targets in proposals to regulate the perceived shortcomings of
managed care or expanding access to health insurance for children.
Broad-based reforms to the individual health insurance market follow a
different, and much slower, pattern of diffusion among the states than
other health care reforms in recent years. Compared to the rapid diffu-
sion of state legislation banning "drive-through deliveries'" in the mid-
1990s (DeClercq and Simmes 1997) and laws which guaranteed direct
access to obstetricians and gynecologists for women (American College
of Nurse Midwives 1998), comprehensive rating and coverage reforms in
the individual market have been slow to take hold.
Building a constituency in support of community rating, guaranteed
issue, and limits on underwriting is not easy, particularly in light ofthe
horror stories told by insurers and other opponents of reform from cases
such as Kentucky and Washington. To date, opponents of reform in the
insurance industry have dominated the policy discourse over reforming
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the individual health insurance market by defining the principal problem
in the marketplace as one of well intentioned but counterproductive over-
regulation by state governments. In the early 1990s, insurers conducted
a national advertising campaign to persuade policy makers and the pub-
lic that risk rating benefited consumers. According to the industry, "If
insurance companies didn't put people into risk groups, it would mean
that low-risk people would be arbitrarily mixed in with high-risk people
. . . and would have to pay higher rates. That would be unfair to every-
one" (Light 1992: 2506). This view, often echoed by conservative cri-
tiques published by the Heritage Foundation and others, blames "mis-
guided" government efforts to increase access to affordable health
insurance in the individual market as the cause of rising premiums, the
withdrawal of indemnity insurers, and adverse selection spirals in regu-
lated markets.
An alternative problem definition, however, offers reformers more
hope of building political support for reforms such as guaranteed issue,
community rating, and restrictions on waiting periods for preexisting
medical conditions (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). In the absence of reforms,
current industry policies blame chronically ill "victims" for their own
plight. As Stone (1989: 632) argues, "The use of health-risk classification
for any allocative purpose—any purpose other than treating people who
could benefit from preventative measures—treats future health as if peo-
ple could control it and lends scientific authority to theories of poverty
and illness that locate the cause in individual will." One ofthe funda-
mental difficulties of unreformed markets is that the individuals most in
need of health insurance coverage often can't get it. As a case in point,
many individuals with recurrent genital herpes have found that insurers
either exclude herpes from their coverage or deny coverage altogether to
persons with herpes (Rice 1999).
The American College of Physicians (1996: 247) has expressed opti-
mism that rating restrictions and other reforms in the individual health
insurance market have expanded coverage to less healthy persons with-
out "hemorrhaging healthy persons from the insurance pool and further
destabilizing markets" The case studies presented in this issue clearly
challenge this optimistic appraisal of the impact of reform. Without the
active cooperation of health insurers, incremental reforms to the indi-
vidual health insurance market have limited potential to Increase access
to health insurance, and may reduce the choices available to young,
healthy subscribers. In a health care system in which insurance remains
a commodity, not a social right, policy makers must tread gingerly in
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enactitig reforms, for the willingness of insurers to exercise their exit
option may destabilize existing markets, resulting in both higher costs
and diminished choice for consumers.
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